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SUMMARY 
 
The core topic of this study is the extent to which in criminal cases the existing 
requirements set for reasoned decisions as to the facts sufficiently meet the 
functions which such reasoned decisions must perform. These functions are: 
control, raising the court’s awareness and explication. The function of control 
implies that it must become clear from the statement of reasons given by the 
court that the rules governing the decision to be taken have been observed and 
that the parties directly involved are given the opportunity on appeal to raise 
questions about the decision before a Court of Appeal or the Netherlands 
Supreme Court. The function of raising the court’s awareness is linked to the 
idea that if a court knows in advance that it must provide the reasons for its 
decision in writing and so does, it will be faced with specific questions that need 
to be answered. The function of explication, finally, refers to the court 
explaining to the parties involved and the public, by way of the included 
reasons, on what grounds it has arrived at its decision. The functions of control 
and awareness-raising both relate to guaranteeing the correctness of the decision 
and, seen from the perspective of these functions, the statement of reasons 
serves to enforce or supplement the existing rules of evidence. The degree to 
which the statement of reasons meets these functions is therefore in part 
dependent on the extent and scope of the law of evidence. The function of 
explication has a far lesser direct impact in an evidentiary sense and must rather 
be viewed in the light of guaranteeing an independent, impartial and public 
administration of justice.  
 
The study commences with an historical exploration of the rules of evidence and 
the rules governing the express statement of reasons. The exploration shows 
that, since the coming into effect of the first Code of Criminal Procedure in 
1838, there has been a clear link between the rules of evidence and those 
governing the express statement of reasons. This connection is found most 
clearly in the debate that raged during the 19th century on maintaining the 
limited statutory evidentiary system introduced in 1838, in which the Dutch 
Code of Criminal Procedure contains an exhaustive list of the means of evidence 
and minimum standards of proof. Opponents to this system pointed out that the 
application of general rules of evidence must necessarily lead to incorrect results 
in individual criminal cases. They deem that the correctness of the decision as to 
the facts is better served if the court is obliged to give the reasons for its 
decision. When the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1926 was introduced, this 
criticism was only partly met. A number of unsuitable rules of evidence were 
abolished and partly replaced by additional duties imposed on the court to state 
its reasons. This applies to the abolishment of inference as a means of evidence 
(het bewijsmiddel der aanwijzingen) and the use of non-sworn witness 
statements. In their place came the duty to expressly underpin the relevance of 
facts – still found in part in Article 359, par. 3, Dutch Code of Criminal 
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Procedure (DCCP) – and the duty to state additional reasons where use is made 
of non-sworn witness statements – still found in Article 360 DCCP. In the draft 
of the Ort Commission (Staatscommissie Ort) the minimum standards for 
establishing proof were abolished and replaced by a duty to provide additional 
reasons where the court wishes to base the proof on the sole statement of the 
defendant or a sole witness statement. In the final stage, this proposal was 
dropped and as a result the statutory (DCCP) evidentiary system – with its 
exhaustive list of the means of evidence and minimum standards for establishing 
proof – has been maintained in essence. However, apart from the two 
requirements as to reasoned decisions referred to above, two additional 
requirements were laid down in the Code, namely: the requirement that the 
judgment must contain the content of the means of evidence employed and that 
the decision as to the facts must be reasoned.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the way in which subsequently, after 1926, the rules of 
evidence have been interpreted. Such interpretation can be summed up by a 
single word: broadly. To all aspects that are characteristic of the rules of 
evidence laid down in the DCCP, the Netherlands Supreme Court has made 
exceptions through its case law. For example, for a long time now, the list of the 
means of evidence has been non-exhaustive, because all forms of evidence may, 
in effect, be conveyed indirectly, orally or in writing, as a result of the 
testimomium-de-auditu (hearsay testimony) construction approved by the 
Netherlands Supreme Court. A broad interpretation of the means of evidence of 
the court’s “own observation” has also contributed to the erosion of the limited 
statutory evidentiary system. The statutory minimum standards for establishing 
proof are hardly relevant, because they relate to the alleged facts as a whole and 
therefore do not require that the involvement of the defendant must be evident 
from more than a single source. And finally, the Netherlands Supreme Court has 
construed rather broadly the specific requirements set for the means of evidence, 
for instance the provision that witnesses may only testify about what was 
observed or experienced personally. Only the Strasbourg Court has imposed 
further normative requirements in relation to the decision as to the facts. These 
ensue from the right of the defence to hear witnesses, which is an elaboration of 
the right to a fair trial laid down in Article 6 ECHR. The Netherlands Supreme 
Court has subsequently exercised considerable restraint in applying the 
Strasbourg norms.  
 
Chapters 4 through 6 deal with the specific duties to expressly state the reasons 
for the court’s decision, as incorporated into the DCCP in 1926. In view of the 
framing history of the Code, the expectation could be that the less strict the 
statutory rules of evidence are, the more the resulting vacuum in regulating the 
decision as to the facts would be filled by further reasoning requirements. This 
expectation is false, however.  
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The main topic of Chapter 4 is the court’s duty to disclose the content of the 
means of evidence in the judgment. Although originally, according to the 
legislator, this requirement was not intended as a rule governing reasoned 
decisions, for a long time it proved to be the main source of accountability for 
the decision as to the facts. The inclusion in the judgment of the content of the 
means of evidence employed by the court allows determination of whether or 
not the evidence satisfies the statutory requirements; of whether it is relevant for 
what has been established as proven; and of whether it is sufficient, in view of 
the minimum standards of proof prescribed by the DCCP. In addition, for a long 
time the Netherlands Supreme Court stressed the importance of the provision, 
because it is easy for the defendant to find out about the evidence against him if 
the content of the means of evidence is included in the judgment.  
 
There are, however, many exceptions to the requirement that the content of the 
means of evidence must be included in the convicting judgment. The most 
essential is that, only where an appeal is lodged against the judgment, must all 
data relevant to the decision as to the facts be added to the judgment. Until such 
moment or where no appeal is lodged, it is sufficient to write an abridged 
judgment in which only the conclusion relating to the decision as to the facts is 
found. Where decisions by single judges (unus rule) are concerned, and in the 
case of a confessing defendant, the full content of the evidence against the 
defendant need not be included, even after an appeal has been lodged with a 
Court of Appeal or the Netherlands Supreme Court. A reference by the court as 
to the provenance of the evidence – the case file – suffices. The requirement of 
stating the reasons for judicial decisions by including the content of the means 
of evidence employed neither applies, to a large degree, in the Promis project, a 
project aimed at improving express reasoning in criminal judgments, which was 
started in 2004. In addition, it has emerged that some district courts, after an 
appeal has been lodged, fail to add the data pertaining to the means of evidence 
employed or a reference to the source of these means of evidence. The courts 
defend such practice by pointing at the content of the appellate proceedings. In 
such proceedings, the case is re-tried in full and possible errors in the judgment, 
such as the failure to include, in the judgment, evidence against the accused, 
may be corrected without further consequences.  
 
Chapter 5 deals with the requirement that the evidence must be relevant. This 
requirement was expressed in the Code of Criminal Procedure by the court’s 
duty to indicate which facts and circumstances are relevant. In 2005, this duty 
was repealed and at present it is sufficient if the content of the means of 
evidence, as included in the judgment, is relevant. The change is, in effect, a 
codification of existing practice going back to the introduction, in 1926, of the 
Code. All the duty entailed, after all, was that the court, in its judgment, 
included a standard phrase to the effect that: ‘the means of evidence listed in the 
judgment contain the relevant facts and circumstances on which the court has 
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founded its conviction’. Since this practice was accepted by the Netherlands 
Supreme Court, the reasoned-judgment rules included in Article 359, par. 3 
DCCP, have never accomplished what was intended by the legislator, namely 
that the court, in its judgment, discloses its logical thought process. This is 
regrettable, especially if a construction is used whereby proof is inferred from 
circumstantial evidence. In such cases, the criminal court does not have to 
express in the judgment what it has inferred from which facts and 
circumstances. Listing the evidence without further explanation suffices. The 
Netherlands Supreme Court will only intervene if the court’s decision as to the 
facts cannot be inferred from the evidence. 
In the case of special evidentiary constructions, such as using the fact that the 
defendant remains silent or lies, or the use of similar past occurrences as 
evidence (schakelbewijs), the court must provide an explanation of the relevance 
of the evidence, because a mere listing of the content of the evidence does not 
show its relevance for the court’s decision to convict. This also holds true for the 
refutation of evidence by what is referred to as Meer en Vaart defences. At issue 
here is whether there may be an alternative explanation for the evidence. In 
those cases, in which the relevance of the evidence is not automatically evident 
or is disputed, the trier of fact must state additional reasons in its judgment. In 
many instances, such a statement could consist in the inclusion of a standard 
phrase, such as ‘clearly intended to cover up the truth’, ‘not supplied a statement 
which invalidates the relevance of the evidence’, or ‘what has been adduced by 
the defence is not persuasive’.    
 
The reliability of evidence is discussed in Chapter 6. Assessment of the 
reliability of evidence is premised on the court’s discretion. This discretion is 
expressed in the following standard consideration of the Netherlands Supreme 
Court: ‘selection and evaluation of the evidence is reserved for the trier of fact’. 
The court is not obliged to give account of its selection and evaluation. An 
exception to this rule is laid down in Article 360 DCCP. Where the court uses 
non-sworn statements, statements by (partly) anonymous persons, accused 
turned state witness and shielded witnesses, it must state the reason for such use 
ex officio. The reason for this duty to state reasons lies in the fact that these 
forms of evidence, by their nature, may be unreliable or that independent review 
of their reliability by the adjudging court is made more difficult. The duty to 
state the reasons for its decision purports either to make the court aware of the 
precarious character of these forms of evidence, or to express, in the judgment, 
that it has independently examined the reliability of the evidence. This noble 
purpose is partly undone by the case law of the Netherlands Supreme Court in 
which the scope of Article 360 DCCP has been limited; the trier of fact, for 
example, does not have to readily assume that the statement is a non-sworn 
statement or an anonymous statement within the meaning of Article 360 DCCP. 
A second exception to the premise of discretionary selection and evaluation is 
founded in the case law of the Netherlands Supreme Court. Although for a long 
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time the second requirement, laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 359 DCCP, 
that the decision as to the facts must be reasoned, lacked significance, from the 
eighties onwards, the Netherlands Supreme Court began to alter this. In a 
number of specific cases, it demanded that the criminal court, in its judgment, 
give its reasons for its selection and evaluation of the evidence, provided that the 
defence has conducted an unambiguous and well-founded defence in relation to 
this issue. Regarding the reliability of evidence, the Netherlands Supreme Court 
has assumed such a duty of reply in relation to statements by anonymous 
witnesses, accused turned state witness, and expert witnesses whose expertise is 
disputed, or where the reliability of the method employed by them is contested. 
The first two instances are now listed in Article 360 DCCP and with regard to 
these there is a duty to state reasons ex officio. Statutory rules have also been 
created where the other instances are concerned. From January 2005 onwards, 
the rule is that each express and reasoned assertion put forward by the defence 
or the Public Prosecutor’s Office may only be rejected by the court by stating 
the grounds for such rejection (Article 359, par. 2, second full sentence DCCP). 
The statutory rules do not only depart from previous case law as to the extent of 
the court’s duty to state reasons for its decision, but the underlying reason for 
the duty to state reasons differs as well. In those cases, in which the Netherlands 
Supreme Court accepted a duty to state additional reasons, this was intended, 
among other things, to have expressed, in the judgment, that the criminal court, 
rather than the examining magistrate or the expert witness, bears the ultimate 
responsibility for uncovering the truth. The duty to reply as laid down in the 
second full sentence of Article 359, par. 2 DCCP is much more intended to give 
structure to the uncovering of the truth, in which increasingly the emphasis is 
placed on the parties’ position in the matter. In criminal proceedings and the 
outcome of these – the judgment –, the focus must be on matters that divide the 
parties. Increasing emphasis on what the parties submit will push the court’s 
responsibility for establishing the relevant facts and circumstances to the 
background.   
 
From Chapters 3 through 6 it may be concluded therefore that in the Netherlands 
the rules of evidence are interpreted far less narrowly than is to be expected on 
the grounds of the content and background of the statutory rules. Moreover, 
judicial discretion in establishing and evaluating the facts is not compensated by 
a more narrow interpretation of the rules on stating reasons. Only the general 
duty to reply, effective from 1 January 2005, and its predecessors in case law 
could be evidence of a renewed interest in further regulation of the decision as to 
the facts, because additional requirements relating to the stating of reasons are 
set. However, the requirements set for obtaining a reply from the court to the 
assertions submitted by the defence or the prosecution, the playing down of the 
sanction of nullity formulated by the Netherlands Supreme Court and the 
absence of a substantive evaluation of the reply given are an indication that 
further regulation of the decision as to the facts is clearly not envisaged. The aim 
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is to have a tailored statement of reasons, in the sense that the court must only 
explain its judgment if this is expressly requested by a party to the proceedings 
and where such a request is accompanied by all relevant arguments.  
 
How different the situation in Germany, as discussed in Chapter 7. In 
contradistinction to the Netherlands, Germany does not have a limited statutory 
evidentiary system. All forms of evidence are allowed, in principle, providing 
they are presented to the court according to the relevant requirements. This 
means that the rules regarding the presentation of evidence in court, both as to 
form and content, must have been met. If these have been complied with, it is at 
the court’s discretion to evaluate the evidence. This has been expressly laid 
down in § 261 Strafprozessordnung (StPO). In Germany, the emphasis is 
therefore on regulation of the presentation of the evidence in court and far less 
on the court’s evaluation of the evidence. Nevertheless, the Bundesgerichtshof 
has held that it does not suffice for the decision as to the facts that the court is 
persuaded by the evidence. Such persuasion must have its foundation in the 
objective establishment of facts and must be in accordance with rules of general 
experience and scientific insights. In this respect, control is exercised in last 
instance and, to enable such control, the German criminal court must include in 
its judgment all facts and circumstances relevant to the decision as to the facts 
and must effectively weigh these. If it fails to do so, this may mean that it has 
not complied with its duty to investigate ex officio, or that it has not been 
thorough in evaluating the evidence. In specific cases – as in the case of 
conflicting statements (Aussage gegen Aussage) or the accused’s silence – the 
Bundesgerichtshof has in effect dictated which aspects the court must involve in 
evaluating the evidence and include in the judgment.   
 
There is a remarkable difference between the Netherlands and Germany 
regarding the inclusion of the reasons for the court’s decision, since in Germany, 
in spite of an express provision (§ 261 StPO), the court’s discretion in respect of 
the evaluation of the evidence has been curtailed by the imposition of rules on 
stating reasons, whereas in the Netherlands there are specific statutory 
provisions governing the duty to state reasons, which from the very beginning 
have been robbed of their significance. A second remarkable difference is that in 
Germany the initiative to state the reasons for the decision lies exclusively with 
the criminal court, and therefore the rule followed in the Netherlands that stating 
reasons is only prescribed if the parties, by conducting a defence, indicate that 
they wish to discuss the decision as to the facts does not apply. A third 
difference is the extent of last-instance review of the decision as to the facts. 
Compared to Germany, in the Netherlands such review is very limited.  
The above differences are caused by a deviating law of evidence and criminal 
procedure. In both countries, an attempt was made to incorporate into the law a 
system which could guarantee the correctness of the decision as to the facts. In 
Germany, a choice was made for a system in which the emphasis lies on 
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presentation of the evidence before the court, so that the court is able 
independently to evaluate the available evidence. In the Netherlands, on the 
other hand, the emphasis has been placed on regulating, by means of statutory 
rules of evidence, the phase in which the evidence is evaluated. Within the 
limited statutory evidentiary system, the stating of reasons is of a predominantly 
procedural character, the emphasis shifting to control of statutory requirements 
with much less emphasis placed on the content of the evidence.  
The original emphasis on presentation of the evidence in court and therefore less 
on evidence evaluation has resulted in Germany as well in a far-reaching duty 
for the criminal court to investigate ex officio, which duty may be reviewed in 
last-instance proceedings. The reason behind such a duty is that, where the court 
is not bound by rules governing evidence evaluation, there must be a guarantee, 
in any case, that it has at its disposal all relevant facts and circumstances in order 
to take the decision. The fact that the Bundesgerichtshof deemed it necessary to 
curtail the court’s discretion in relation to evaluation of the evidence, has not 
negatively affected the importance of the court’s duty to investigate. On the 
contrary, it is evident that such a duty to investigate gains in significance, if a 
court is also obliged to involve and weigh the facts and circumstances that have 
emerged as a result of its investigation.  
The final difference between Germany and the Netherlands relates to review of 
the decision as to the facts by the last-instance court. Whereas in the Netherlands 
the Netherlands Supreme Court will exercise much more restraint in reviewing 
the decision as to the facts and conducts a marginal test as to the reasonableness 
of the decision, its German counterpart conducts a much more intensive review. 
Judgments by German courts must show that the court has examined all relevant 
facts and has involved these in its decision, while observing rules of general 
experience and scientific insights. This evaluation goes much further and may be 
explained in part by the absence of a means of appeal in serious criminal cases. 
Review of the evaluation of the evidence enables the Bundesgerichtshof to 
check the correctness and completeness of the investigation into the facts. 
Where defects are discovered, the judgment will be quashed in last-instance 
proceedings before the Netherlands Supreme Court and the case will be referred 
back. Thus, the guarantee that the facts will be evaluated by two courts is 
preserved, be it by detour.  
 
The final chapter is dedicated to the importance of the inclusion of the reasons 
for the court’s decision and the concomitant functions. Stating reasons is 
important, because it legitimises the decision ultimately taken by the court. The 
statement of reasons must show that the court has arrived at the correct decision. 
Arriving at a correct decision is safeguarded by the fact that the court is subject 
to the law; by the quality of the decision maker (independent, impartial and 
knowledgeable); and by the possibility to dispute the evidence. The question as 
to whether in a specific case these safeguards have been observed only becomes 
evident from the judgment and the statement of reasons included in it. In that 
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respect, the statement of reasons is therefore an essential condition for 
guaranteeing a proper search for the truth. The statement must show that the 
statutory limits applying to the decision as to the facts have been observed; it 
must demonstrate that the court has arrived at its decision in an independent, 
impartial and knowledgeable way and show that the court has examined and 
assessed the weight of the parties’ assertions. Here, the functions of control and 
awareness raising are invoked. The function of explication contributes to a lesser 
extent to guaranteeing a proper search for the truth. Its main goal is to maximise 
communication between the court and those involved – the parties to the 
proceedings and the public. By providing an explanation, the court’s judgment 
and the administration of justice in general gain in authority.  
In the Netherlands, the reasoned statement as to proof has traditionally been 
dominated by the functions of control and awareness raising. However, it has 
lost much of its value, because the Netherlands Supreme Court has narrowly 
construed the rules governing evidence and the duty to state the reasons for the 
decision. As a result, there is little control to be exercised in the area of the law 
of evidence and there is not always a legal necessity to show, in the judgment, 
that the court has examined all relevant facts and circumstances. The only 
exception to this is the duty to reply to the assertions of the parties as included in 
the DCCP per 1 January 2005. Although the Netherlands Supreme Court has 
also construed this duty narrowly, it could nevertheless serve to regulate the 
decision as to the facts. This, however, would require that the decision as to the 
facts be more intensively reviewed in last-instance appellate proceedings. Thus 
far, the Netherlands Supreme Court does not seem to wish to follow the example 
set by its German counterpart in this respect. And so the duty to reply seems to 
be aimed predominantly at providing an explanation to the parties involved and 
to the public, without there being a possibility of subjecting the explanation 
itself to judicial review. Moreover, such an explanation is only required where 
the parties expressly so request. If they fail to do so, or if they fail to meet the 
applicable procedural requirements, this could be an indication for the court that 
there is no need for an additional statement of reasons.  
 
Translation by: 
Louise Rayar, B. tr 
